Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1969

A. Norman Grover; Arthur N. Grover; Estella v.
Grover; Floyd E. Grover; Fay G. Wight; Amy G.
Jensen; Max L. Grover; Jesse G. Parry; Joyce Anna
G. Smith And June G. Huffman v. Oleen Garn And
Maxine B. Garn, His Wife; Darvel Garn And
Bonnie L. Garn, His Wife; Clive Garn And Aloha
Garn, His Wife; And Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc.
And Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc. v. Oleen Garn
And Maxine B. Garn, His Wife; Darvel Garn And
Bonnie L. Garn, His Wife; And Clive Garn And
Aloha
Garn : Brief of Appellant
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Clifford L. Ashton; Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Grover v. Garn, No. 10038 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4252

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of
A. NORMAN GROVER; ARTHUR N.
GROVER; ESTELLA V. GROVER;
FLOYD E. GROVER; FAY G. WIGHT;
AMY G. JENSEN; MAX L. GROVElt;
JESSE G. PARRY; JOYCE ANNA G.
SMITH and JUNE G. HUFFMAN,
Plaintiff•

au A~ts°' .

vs.
OLEEN GARN and MAXINE B.. GAB.Nt
his wife; DARVEL GARN and BONNIE
L. GARN, his wife; CLIVE GARN a:ad·
ALOHA GARN, his wife; and ARTHUlt
N. GROVER FARMS, INC., a corparMi•,
Defendant• olll4 R~'~
ARTHUR N. GROVER FAil.MS, INC., a .
corporation,
),£
PllJ/i:1£t.iff

a.u

.

vs.
OLEEN GARN and MAXINE B.
his wife; DARVEL GARN' and B010Gl
L. GARN, his wife; and CLIVE G.
a.nd ALOHA GARN, his wife,

Deftmi/,t/mls fllfMI Ba!INlikll
\,

MANN AND HADFIELD
Walter G. Mann
Reed W. Hadfield
, '" -< ,,
AttornB11• for Defendants imci ~ /',"~.)
35 First Security Bank Building
" '. . ~, ,
Brigham City, Utah
-,. -

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE____________

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT______________________

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL____________________________

4

SU?IL\IARY OF THE PLEADINGS________________________

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS________________________________________

6

POINTS RELIED UPON__________________________________________

12

ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------POINT I. THE CONTRACT OF SALE IS
INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS -------------------------------------------------------------POINT II_ THERE IS NO BASIS FOR
ANY ESTOPPEL OF THE CORPORATION TO DENY THE VALIDITY OF
THE CONTRACT -----------------------------------------------POINT III. THE GROVERS ARE NOT
PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT OF
SALE, DID NOT EXECUTE IT AS INDIVIDUALS AND ARE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE UNDER IT______________________________

13

13

19

26

POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT OF
SALE WAS PREPARED BY THE
GROVERS AND THEIR ATTORNEY__________

29

SUMMARY --------------------------------------------------------------------

32

TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued)
Page
CASES CITED

Aggeler, et al. vs. Blood, 73 Utah 120, 272 P.933 ....

I
I
I
~

17

Anderson vs. Grantsville, etc., 51 Utah 137,
17
169 P.168 ----··-··-···-····-··---·-···-·····-··--·-·-·-·····-··---·····-Bickston vs. Federal Fire Arms Corporation,
38 Cal. Rptr. 793-·-·-·--·····-····-······-···-·-··-·····--·-········
18
Erkenbrecher vs. Grant, 200 P.64L_···-·····-·····----·-·--·-- 29
Geary vs. Cain. 79 Utah 268, 9 P.2d 396 ................ 20, 22, 23
Lochwitz vs. Mining & Milling Co., 37 Utah 349,
16, 17
108 P.1128 -----·-·----·--·····------·-··--···-·------·--·---·--··-----·McDonald vs. Luckenbach, 170 Fed. 434-----······-·-·-----

28

National Bank vs. Beckstead, 68 Utah 421,
250 P.1033 ----···----·------·---··----···------·····-··--·--··-····---·- 21
Nielson vs. Leamington, 87 Utah 69, 48 P.2d 439....
21
Robey vs. Hardy, 63 Utah 231, 224 P.889 ______ ·--··--·--

21

Rock vs. Gustaveson Oil Co., 59 Utah 451, 204 P.96

21

Salt Lake Valley Loan, etc. vs. St. Joseph,
etc., 73 Utah 256, 273 P.50'--·-·-··-----·-··-·---·-···-··-· 17
Stevens vs. First National Bank, 89 Utah 456,
57 P.2d 1099 ____ ···--·-·----·-----·-··--·---·-···-----·--------·-------- 17
STATUTES

16-10-74, U.C.A. (1953)------·--------------·--------·--·------·--·--2,14, 15

I
I
•

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
A. NORMAN GROVER; ARTHUR N.
GROVER; ESTELLA V. GROVER;
FLOYD E. GROVER; FAY G. WIGHT;
AMY G. JENSEN; MAX L. GROVER;
JESSE G. PARRY; JOYCE ANNA G.
SMITH and JUNE G. HUFFMAN,
Pl.aintif f s and Appell.ants,
vs.

Civil No.
10038

OLEEN GARN and MAXINE B. GARN,
his wife; DARVEL GARN and BONNIE
L. GARN, his wife; CLIVE GARN and
ALOHA GARN, his wife; and ARTHUR
N. GROVER FARMS, INC., a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.
ARTHUR N. GROVER FARMS, INC., a
corporation,
Pl.aintif f and ApPell.ant,
vs.
OLEEN GARN and MAXINE B. GARN,
his wife; DARVEL GARN and BONNIE
L. GARN, his wife; and CLIVE GARN
and ALOHA GARN, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

Civil No.
10081

APP·ELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASES
The above cases seek to cancel a contract of sale
whereby Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc., a family corporation organized under the law of Utah, agreed to
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sell and convey to the defendants Garn substantially all
of the assets of the corporation, consisting of several
hundred acres of farm land, water rights and grazing
permits, located in Oneida County, Idaho. The validity
of the contract was assailed npon the grounds:
(1) that the sale was not authorized by the board
of directors nor approved by the stockholders as required
by Section 16-10-74, U.C.A. (1953);
(2) that the officer who purportedly executed the
contract on behalf of the corporation had no authority
to execute it on behalf of the corporation;
(3) that the officer who executed the contract on
behalf of the corporation was aged, infirm, ill and incompetent to act as an agent of the corporation or to understand the nature or legal effect of the contract and was
unduly influenced by her husband to execute it;
( 4) the contract is invalid because it requires the
buyer of the property to pay the purchase price to a
single stockholder and includes property which the corporation did not own.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The same judgment and decree was entered in each
case, adjudging that the individual plaintiffs have no
standing as stockholders or otherwise to attack the sale
or contract of sale and their alleged cause of action be
dismissed with prejudice; that Arthur N. Grover and
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Estella V. Grover, his wife, were physically and mentally
capable of understanding and appreciating the contract
of sale and Pxercised their own free will in the execution
thereof; that Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc. is but the
instrumentality through which the said Arthur N. Grover
and Estella V. Grover, the owners of the stock thereof,
for conveniencP, transacted their business; that "the
Court hereby pierces the corporate veil" and decrees
that the statute relating to corporations and meetings of
stockholdPrs was either complied with or waived when
the owners of the stock entered into the contract of sale;
that Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc., Arthur N. Grover
individually and Estella V. Grover individually, are
bound as a corporation and as individuals by the contract of sale; that Arthur N. Grover and Estella V.
Grover, individually, and the corporation, by their acts
and deeds, are estopped from declaring said contract
of sale is of no force or effect and that each of the
causes of action in the above numbered cases be dismissed ~with prejudice. Arthur N. Grover and Estella V.
Grover,, individually, and the corporation, were ordered
to file with the escrow holder 50 shares of stock in a
water compan>-, and in the event of their failure to do
so, jurisdiction to fix any consequent damage was re8erved. A rnone~· judgment in the sum of $525.00 and attorney's fees in the sum of $5,000.00 was entered against
the corporation and Arthur and Estella Grover individually. Specific performance of the contract of sale
was also decreed.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the entire judgment
and decree appealed from and a remand of the cases
to the lower court with instructions to enter judgment
in favor of appellants, canceling the contract of sale,
quieting the corporation's title to the lands described in
the contract and requiring the respondents to render an
accounting of their operations of the farm and for all
costs incurred.
SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
Case number 10038 originated with the filing of a
ocmplaint by A. Norman Grover against the seller and
the buyers in the contract of sale. The complaint was
signed by the plaintiff but not by any attorney. Plaintiff
identified himself as a stockholder of A. N. Grover
Farms, Inc. Arthur N. Grover, Estella V. Grover, Floyd
E. Grover, Fay G. -Wight, Amy G. Jensen, Max L.
Grover, Jesse G. Parry, Joyce Anna G. Smith and June
G. Huffman were added as parties plaintiff by order of
the court.
The complaint attacked the validity of the contract
of sale upon the ground that it was not authorized by
the directors or stockholders of the seller as required by
Section 16-10-74.
The individual defendants filed an answer, counterclaim and cross complaint. The answer, which is a conglomeration of admissions, denials, affirmative defenses
and immaterial allegations, denies that plaintiff was a
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stockholder of the seller at the time of the sale and alleges he had no right to question the validity of the contract. The counterclaim sought to recover from the plaintiff damages in the amount of $25,000 on account of his
malicious interference with the sale, and a like amount
as exemplary damages.
The cross claim is directed against the corporation
and alleges that it agreed to deposit with the escrow
holder fifty shares of Lone Spring ViiT ater and sixty-five
sharet-; of Taylor Grazing. and failed to do so. An order
requiring compliance with this undertaking is prayed
for.
At this point, the plaintiff appeared by his attorney,
Richard L. Dewsnup, and denied each and every allegation of the counterclaim. A short time later, the cross
defendant appeared by its attorney, E. J. Skeen, and
replied to the cross claim.
""\Ye no-w turn to civil number 10081. This case got
nnder \vay by a complaint by Arthur N. Grover Farms,
Inc., a corporation, against the Garns, who are the purchasers under the contract of sale. This complaint asst•rted that the buyers had not performed the contract
and that it had been terminated by the plaintiff. The
defendants answered and counterclaimed. The same confused denials, admissions, affirmative defenses and immaterial matter appeared in the defendants' answer as
in their answer in 10038. The counterclaim seeks the
same damages, punitive damages and order as the cross
claim in 10038. The plaintiff replied to the counterclaim

by specific admissions and denials. Mr. Skeen withdrew
as attorney for the the plaintiff and attorney L. Brent
Hogan appeared and filed an amended complaint which
attacked the contract of sale upon the grounds set forth
in the above statement of kind of cases. An amended and
supplemental complaint was thereafter filed by attorney
E. J. Skeen. This pleading repeats substantially thP
amended complaint but adds that a confidential adyisor
of Arthur N. Grover assisted tlw dPf endants in obtaining
the unconscionable contract of sale. An altPrnative claim
for a money judgment was asserted in the eYent the contract was adjudged to be valid. The defrndants answered
and reasserted the counterclaim. It "·as stipulated that
the amended complaint filed by attorney L. Brent Hogan
should be withdrawn. Mr. Hogan then withdrew from the
case as attorney for the plaintiff.
Defendants moved that the two cases be consolidated
for trial. No ruling upon this motion appears in the record, but the cases were in fact consolidated for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Arthur N. Grover Farms. Inc. was incorporated under the laws of Utah in 1963 by Fay G. 'Vight, Estella
V. Grover and Arthur N. Grover. The Grovers are the
parents of Fay G. Wight and the: other individual plaintiffs. By the terms of the Articles of Incorporation, it
was empowered to engage in farming and also to bny,
sell, exchange, lease and rent real and personal property and to process, sell and otherwise dispose of all
crops and products of the soil. The capital stock of the
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corporation consisted of 100 shares having no par value.
The incorporaton; were made directors and officers of
the company. Fay G. Wight was made President, her
mother, Vice President, and her father, Secretary and
Treasurer (Ex. 10). The court found that 91 shares of
the stock were issued in exchange for the property coven•d h~- the contract of sale (R. 876). A copy of the contract of sale is attached to the complaint in case munber
10081. The original appears to have been executed on
hehalf of the corporation by Estella Y. Grover, Vice
PrPsidvnt. It is attested by Arthur N. Grover, Secretary
(R. 900) and is dated October 1, 1964.
It is ad111ith·d by all parties that no resolution of
the board of directors authorizing sale was ever adopted;
that no meeting of the board of directors was ever called
or lwld or any notice of any meeting given prior to the
signing of the contract, and that no stockholders' meeting was ewr called or held prior to the sale. None of the
eight children who "·ere stockholders of the corporation
u\·er consented to or approved the sale. On the contrary,
all of them met after the sale and unanimously repudiated it. They directed Norman to bring suit to cancel it
(R. 113, 183, 190, 263, 345-361).

rrhe property covered by the contract of sale included substantially all of the assets of the corporation. It
also included shares of water stock and Taylor Grazing
pt:•rmits which were not owned by the corporation. One
Hundred Twenty acres of the farm was excluded from
the contract since it had been transferred to one of the
children.
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At the time the corporation was formed, 45 shares
of the stock were issued to Arthur N. Grover, 45 shares
to Estella V. Grover, and one share to Mrs. Wight. The
stock book (Ex. 9) shows that shares were issued in May,
July and September of 1963 to <>ach of the eight children.
The stub book was conformed to the issue dates in August, 1964 (Ex. 9, R. 170-179). Prior to tht' sale, Mrs.
Grover gave each of her eight children five of her shares
of stock. The transfers were made in 1964 (R. 170-179).
Accordingly, at the time of the sale in October, 1964,
each of the eight children owned five shares of stock
except Fay, who had six shares. The mother had five
shares and the father 45 shares (R. 207. Ex. 6-8, 18-30).
Following the execution of the contract of sale, an
escrow agreement was signed by the buyer and seller
providing for the deposit of a deed to be delivered to
the buyer on payment of the purchase price. It was executed on behalf of the corporation by Estella V. Grover,
Vice President. The purchase price of the property was
to be paid to Mr. or Mrs. A. N. Grover (Ex. 48).
Both Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover were
past 80 years of age at the time of the sale. Mrs. Grover
was confined to her home by a serious heart condition
and was practically blind (R. 10). She was not present
at the bank where the transaction was closed, and the
certificate of the notary that she personally appeared
before him as signer of the escrow agreement is false.
She had no recollection of signing the contract, the deed
or the escrow insrtuction, and testified that she never
had any intention of selling or disposing of the farm
(R. 814, 816, 817, 818, 819). She testified further that the
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sale was contrary to her wishes; that she had transferred
to her children practically all of the stock she owned (R.
813, 814). She was practically blind and could see only
with the aid of a ma1:,rnifying glass. She was so weak she
required constant care and attention (R. 104-108).
In SeptembE'r of 19G4, Arthur N. Grover who appears to have conducted all of the negotiations leading
up to the sale, suffered a blackout while attempting to
crank a tractor on the farm. He was unconscious for six
hours when he was discovered by acquaintances who administered to him a home n'medy containing strychnine
and quinirn• (R. 76-77).
The evidence discloses that on or about October 1,
19G4, Arthur N. Gronr was ill, infirm and unable to
understand. perceive, remember or exercise normal judgment in the ordinary affairs of life. The two doctors who
attended him during this period of time so testified. Dr.
Robinson treated Arthur N. Grover for many years and
saw him immediately following the episode which occurred in September of 1964. At that time he noticed
that his patient had suffned brain damage by reason of
the episode of unconsciousness (R. 284, 287, 292). This
brain damage was demonstrated by a halting gait,
tremor, loss of memory for recent events, hostility, agitation and a marked personality change. The arteriosclerosis which the doctor had observed prior to the September incident was described as a cause of the brain
clot which induced the unconsciousness. The patient was
also suffering from a nephritic condition resulting in
nocturia which was caused by the sclerosis and was evi-
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dence that the sclerosis existed in an advanced state (R.
285-294,306,308,309,312).
Dr. Felt had observed Mr. Grover for several years
both before and after October, 1964. During a part of
this period of time he had treated him as a patient. He
noted a sudden change which took place in his patient
after the incident of September, 1964. This change was
demonstrated by faulty gait and tremor, marked personality alteration and significant personality attitudes.
These significant attitudes consisted of hostility, agitation, delusions, paranoia, poor memory for recent
events as opposed to good memory for remote events,
physical deterioration demonstrated by further loss of
hearing and sight and loss of weight (R. 313-323).
The banker, Mr. Nelson, who closed the transaction,
thought Arthur N. Grover was competent in 1964, but
not competent at the time of the trial (R. 467). He was indefinite in his mind as to when the incompetence first
manifested itself (R. 468). One of his reasons for concluding that Mr. Grover was incompetent at the time
of the trial was because of Grover's inability to distinguish what property was his and what property belonged
to someone else (R. 468).
All children of Mr. Grover who testified noted that
since the event of September, 1964, their father had
shown a remarkable change. The hostility and agitation
which he developed toward some people was demonstrated by bizarre and abnormal conduct. All observed
a rapid mental and physical deterioration demonstrated
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by loss of memory, inability to understand and a strong
tendency to illusions. One of his sons, Dr. Floyd Grover,
found his father unable to understand or explain the
transaction which had taken place involving the sale of
the farm. Each time he tried to explain the purchase
price he reached a different amount, varying as much
as $20,000 (R. 261-262).
Two of the Grover children had received several
checks from their father during this critical period of
time. Neither had cashed these checks because they were
sure that their father did not realize what he was doing
(R. 110, 114, 275 ).
The Articles of Incorporation provide that the business of the corporation shall be conducted by a board of
three directors. Meetings of stockholders may be called
by th<::~ president. or in the event of her failure or refusal
to act, by a majority vote of the board of directors.
N oticP of any meeting of stockholders, including the annual meeting, must be given by written notice. The Articles do not expressly authorize any officer or director
to act on behalf of the corporation (Ex. 10).
The president of the corporation had no knowledge
of the sale of the property until after it had been consummated. There was no directors' meeting or stockholders' meeting held before the sale and no authority
was given to the vice president to execute the contract
or any other instrument on behalf of the corporation.
The court found that none of the requirements of Section 16-10-74 were complied with (R. 1037). The defend-
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ants were notified before they took possession of the
property that the sale was not authorized and that whatever they did with respect to the property was at their
own risk (R. 345-346). The trial court made no finding
that the sale was made in the usual course of business
of the corporation but the evidence clearly shows that
the usual course of business of the corporation was farmmg.
It is uncontroverted that the sale covered substantially all of the assets of the corporation and that in
effect it was a liquidation and termination of the business
for which the corporation was organized.

The contract of sale was prepared in the office of
Mr. Skeen but it simply a redraft of Exhibit 33 which
was drawn by the bank (R. 87).
POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
THE CONTRACT OF SALE IS INVALID
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
POINT II
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ANY ESTOPPEL OF THE CORPORATION TO DENY
THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT.
POINT III
THE GROVERS ARE NOT PARTIES TO
THE CONTRACT OF SALE, DID NOT EX-
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ECUTE IT AS INDIVIDUALS AND ARE
NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE UNDER IT.
POINT IY
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE CONTRACT OF SALE WAS PREPARED BY THE GROVERS AND THEIR ATTORNEY.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONTRACT OF SALE IS INVALID
BECAUSE IT \VAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
It is not controverted that the contract of sale covered substantially all of the assets of the corporation.
One hundred twenty acres which had been given to one
of the children was hacked out of the transaction. There
were a few items of farm machinery not included in the
contract, but then' is not sufficient evidence to indicate
that the corporation ever owned them.
It is beyond dispute that if the contract of sale is
uphelp, the corporation will be stripped of the means
of carrying on the business for which it was organized.
It was incorporated for the purpose of operating the
farm more particularly described in the contract of sale.
The operation of this farm was the only business ever
conducted by the corporation.
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Respondents made a futile attempt to evade this
situation by pointing out that the Articles empowered
the corporation to buy and sell real estate. It is true
that the corporation had this power, but it is also true
that it never pretended to exercise it. It never did buy
or sell any real estate either for itself or as agent for
others. Every corporate activity that it ever carried on
was confined to the operation of the farm.
There is no escape from the conclusion that if the
contract of sale is upheld it will operate as a liquidation
of the assets and a distribution thereof to the stockholders. The purchase money paid automatically becomes
a dividend within the meaning of the tax statutes. The
tax impact on the transaction would be staggering.
There can likewise be no controversy that this sale
was not a sale made in the usual course of business of
the corporation which consisted of producing and marketing the products of the farm.
Section 16-10-74, U.C.A. (1953) provides that a sale
of all or substantially all the property and assets with
or without good will of the corporation, if not made in
the usual and regular course of business, may be made
upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration as may be authorized in the following manner:
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution
recommending such sale and directing the submission
thereof to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which
may be either an annual or special meeting.
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(b) Written or printed notice shall be given to
each shareholder of record entitled to vote at such meeting within the time and in the manner provided in this
Act for giving notice of meetings of shareholders, and
whether the meeting be annual or special, shall state
that the purpose of the meeting is to consider the proposed sale.
( c) At such meeting the shareholders may authorize such sale and may fix or may authorize the board
of directors to fix any or all of the terms and conditions
tlwrpof and the consideration to be received by the corporation therefor. Each outstanding share of the corporation shall be entitled to vote thereon, even though
such shareholder may not, under the provisions of the
Articl\:'s of Incorporation, be entitled to a vote. Such
authorization shall require the affirmative vote of at
lt>ast a majority of the outstanding shares of the corporation.
( d) After such authorization by a vote of shareholders, the board of directors nevertheless, in its discretion, may abandon the sale subject to the rights of
third partif's under any contracts relating thereto.
It will be noted that the authority of a corporation
to Sf'll substantially all of its property can only be exercised by the board of directors, and that they must act
as a unit. This means, of course, that the directors
must meet, debate the subject and render a formal decision fixing the terms of the sale.
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In the case of Lochwitz vs. Mining <f; Milling Co.,
37 Utah 379, 108 P. 1128, it was expressly decided:
"Again, under statutes similar to ours, a quorum of the board of directors must act as a unit
when discharging or when authorizing any one
to execute corporate powers. ( 4 Thompson on
Corps. 4619; 10 Cyc. 775.) The rule is well and
tersely stated in Cyc. in the following language:
'The board of directors to whom the authority to bind the corporation is committed
is not the individual directors scattered here
and there, whose assent to a given act may
be collected by a diligent canvasser, but it
is the board sitting and consulting together
in a body. Individual directors, or any number of them less than a quorum, have no
authority as directors to bind the corporation. And this is equally the rule, although
the director who assumes to do so may own
a majority of the shares.'"
The trial court held and the evidence is clear and
positive that the board of directors of Arthur N. Grover
Farms, Inc. never at any time authorized the contract
of sale which is the subject matter of these actions. They
never considered it either formally or informally. One
of the directors had never heard about the purpm;ed sale
until after it had been completed.
Another director, Mrs. Estella Grover, was practically blind and so aged and infirm as to require constant medical care and attention. There is nothing to
indicate that she ever had any prior notice or information of the sale until her signature to the contract was
obtained at the last moment through the influence of
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her husband. All of the negotiations leading up to the
contract were conducted solely by Arthur N. Grover,
who himself was so feeble, infirm and mentally disturbed
that he was unabled to comprehend any of the consequences of the proposed sale.
The complete absence of any authorization from
the board of directors of the corporation to make this
sale is snch a vital and fundamental defect that we never
reach the question whether it was approved by the stockholders. We accept the court's finding that it was not
anthorized or approved by either the directors or the
stockholders.
The contract of sale was executed by Mrs. Grover
as Yice President. Mr. Grover merely attested the instrument, that is, he certified to the seal of the corporation and the signature of the Vice President. Since
neithPr of them was authorized by the board of directors
to make any sale of the property of the corporation,
their execution of the contract of sale on behalf of the
corporation was without any legal force or effect.
The cases of Aggeler, et al. vs. Blood, 73 Utah 120,
272 P. 933; Anderson vs. Grantsville, etc., 51 Utah 137,
169 P. 168; Stevens vs. First Natioanl Bank, 89 Utah
456, 57 P.2d 1099; Lochwitz vs. Pine Tree, 37 Utah 349,
108 P. 1128; Salt Lake Valley Loan, etc. vs. St. Joseph,
etc., 73 Utah 256, 273 P. 507, fully sustain this fundamental proposition.
The statute of California relating to sales of substantially all the assets of the corporation is substantially
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the same as our Section 16-10-74. In Bickston vs. Federal
Fire Arms Corporation, 38 Cal. Rptr. 793, a stockholder
brought suit to recover for the wrongful disposition of
corporate assets. These asset were diposed of without
any authorization by the board of directors and without
any resolution of the board directing the sale. The court
held the sale invalid. We quote from the opinion:

"It is clear from the evidence herein that the
corporation, through the acts of Lippe, its president and a stockholder, and of Evans and Worrall,
stockholders, conveyed, exchanged, transferred or
disposed of all or substantially all of its property
and assets without compliance with the foregoing
section of the Corporations Code. Concedely the
corporate acts of paying substantially all of its
assets in exchange for stock in the names of plaintiff and Lippe were without authority of a resolution of its board of directors and without the
approval either by vote or written consent of its
shareholders.
(3) It is the rule in this state that, while a corporation may dispose of all its assets and wind up
its business when authorized by its directors and
approved by a majority of the voting power of
its stockholders, the officers or directors have no
power to dispose of all or substantially all of its
assets without fully complying with the said section 3901.
As said in J eppi v. Brockman Holding Co., 34
Cal. 2d 11, 15-16, 206 P. 2d 847, 849, 9 A.L.R. 2d
1297: 'The reason for this limitation is that a
corporation is organized for the purpose of doing
business of some nature, and if so, its shareholders have the right to insist that the corporation continue for the purpose for which it was
organized. A sale, the,refore, of all its property,
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or so much thereof as would prevent it from continuing in such business, would constitute a violation of the corporate contract.'
( 4) The statute in question was enacted for
the protection of shareholders and creditors of the
corporation, and they alone have the right to
object to the transfer of corporate assets in violation of the code section. Transactions. such as
those herein made, are violative of the provisions
of the statute, are voidable and may be rescinded
and set aside at the election of a shareholder or
creditor, for whose benefit alone the statute was
enacted. ( Solorza v. Park Water Co., 86 Cal
App. 2d 653, 658-659, 195 P. 2d 523.) Plaintiff
is such a stockholder and creditor."
POINT II
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ANY ESTOPPEL OF THE CORPORATION TO DENY
THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT.
\Ve have demonstrated that the contract of sale embraced all or substantiall~· all of the assets of the corporation and was not a sale in the usual course of business
and not binding because neither Estella V. Grover nor her
lmshand, Arthur N. Grover, had any authority from the
board of directors to make any sale or to execute the contract of sale.
There is no need to pursue this point further because
the trial court, both in its memorandum opinion and in its
findings of fact, determined that the contract of sale was
not authorized by any action of the board of directors
or the stockholders of the corporation Its decision that
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the contract \Vas binding upon tlw corporation was based
solely upon the ground of estoppel. The first question for
determination on this appeal is whether there is an.'· basis
in this record for such an t•stoppel. \Ve maintain that
there is not.
The trial court creates the estoppel from a finding
that Mr and Mrs. Grover "were the true owners of this
corporation at the time of the transaction as they had
theretofore been the owners of the farm prior to the formation of the corporation." It then proceeds to "pierce
the corporate veil" and hold the ''corporation bound by
the acts of thos0 who owned the company when the deal
was made."
This is the first time that an.'· court, so far as we
can determine, ever "pierced a corporate veil" in order
to validate a totally unauthorized sale of the corporation's
assets for the sole benefit of one or another of its officers.
The only situation in which Utah courts have ever allowed
the piercing of the corporate veil was to prevent the
commission of a fraud or perpetration of a wrong. SeP
Geary vs. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P.2d 396.
In order to pierce the corporate yeil tlw court had to
find that Mr. and Mrs. Grover were tlw "true" O\\·ners
of the corporation, that is, that they owned all of the stock
and used the corporation as a naked instrumentality for
conducting their own private affairs. Such a finding
cannot be sustained. It is undisputed that at the time
the sale to defendants was made the stock of the corporation was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Grover and their eight
children. One of children became a stockholder at the
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time the corporation >ms created. Forty shares of the
stock issued to Mrs. Grover at the time of the incorporation had been given by her to her children before the sale
in controversy took place. rrhere may be some question
in the evidence as to when the certificates were actually
delivered to the children, but it is immaterial so far as
this case is concerned wh<c•ther the certificates were ever
actually delivered. See Nielson vs. Leamington, 87 Utah
69, 48 P.2d 439. Certificates of stock are mPrely evidence
of muniments of title. See Rock vs. Gustaveson Oil Company, 59 Utah 431, 204 P. 96. Delivery of the certificate
is not an essential to transfer of ownership. See National
Bank vs. Beckstead, G8 rtah 421, 250 P. 1033; Rouey us.
Hardy, 63 Utah 231, 224 P.889.
A share of stock is a chose in action and it may be
transferred as any other chose of action may be transferred. It is purely a matter of intention of the owner to
part ·with his interest. If that intention is clearly expressed, either orally or in writing, it will be given effect.
There is no controversy in this action between any
of the Grovers as to the ownership of the stock. The evidence is uncontradicted that at the time the contract of
sale was made, each of the eight chidren of Mr. and Mrs.
Grover was a stockholder in thecorporation and entitled
to vote and to attack the validity of the sale.
The stock book likewise affirms the ownership of
stock in the children. The defendants make no claim to
any of the stock and they are in no way concerned with
the title or ownership as between the members of the
Grover family.
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'11he stock of the corporation was issued in exchange
for the property conveyed to it by Mr. and Mrs. Grover.
There is and can be no question concerning their right to
distribute this stock among their children in any manner
they saw fit. They did distribute a very substantial portion of this stock to the children prior to the ex~ution
of the contract of sale.

The very purpose of creating this family corporation
and transferring the farm property to it was to avoid
the expense of probate and to vest in the children a
present equitable interest in the land.
The court's finding upon the question of stock ownership of the corporation is ambiguous and uncertain. There
is no clear-cut finding that all of the stock of the corporation was vested solely in Mr. and Mrs. Grover. Admittedly
one share was issued to the daughter Fay, and the actual
finding of the court with respect to the stock ownership
of the other children is simply that they did not have
actual possession of the written certificates until after
the sale. In any event a finding that the coropration is a
mere instrumentality of the Grovers and that the ownership of the real property remained in them, notwithstanding the conveyance to the corporation, is without any
support whatever in the record.
The case of Geary v. Cain, supra, presents a similar
situation so far as the status of the corporation is concerned. The plaintiff in that case obtained a money judgment against Addison Cain. She then brought suit against
the Doris Trut Company to subject the property of the
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corporation to the payment of the money judgment
against Cain. Plaintiff asserted that Doris Trust Company was the alter ego and agent of Addison Cain and
that the property which he had conveyed to the corporation in exchange for the stock was in reality the property
of Addison Cain, notwithstanding the conveyance. The
books of the corporation showed that part of the stock
of the Doris Trust Company belonged to the wife and the
children of Addison Cain. Plaintiff contended that any
issue of stock to the wife or children was fictitious and
without any consideration. The trial court found in
accordance with plaintiff's contention, but the Supreme
Court expressly repudiated the finding. This of course
destroyed the foundation for any theory that the court
could pierce the corporate veil.
"A showing that Cain owns all, or substantially
of the outstanding shares of the Doris Trust Company, or that the persons in whose names they
stand hold the same in trust for him, is vital to the
plaintiff's case under her first theory. Courts of
equity and courts of law a well, and courts which
administer both law and equity in the same action,
as do the courts of this state, will, to prevent fraud
and accomplish justice, in proper cases ignore the
legal fiction that a corporation is a person separate and distinct from the person or group of persons who own its stock. Western Securities Co. v.
Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 P. 856; D.l. Felsenthal Co.
v. Northern Assurance Co., 284 Ill. 343, 120 N.E.
268, 1 A.L.R. 602, and annotation on page 610."
"The corporate entity cannot be ignored, where,
as here appears, the stock is owned by the children,
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and it does not appear that they hold title to the
shares in trust for their father."
* * *
"The doctrine simply means that the courts, ignoring forms and looking to the substance of
things will regard the stockholders of a corporation as the owners of its pro1wrty, or as the real
parties in interest, whenever it is necessary to do
to prevent a fraud which might otherwise be perpetrated, to redress a wrong ·which might otherwise fail. It cannot he applied in this case, which
is an action against the corporation and a person
who holds bnt onP shan' of its stock, so long as it
appears that there an• other stockl10ldt>rs, ·who are
not parties to tlw action, mrning all hut one of the
ontstanding slian•s and it is not made to appear
that t1wy hold the sa11w in trnst for Addison Cain."

The conhonrsy in this litigation cannot be resolved
by indulging in legal fictions and ignoring incontrovertible facts. TlH:' conrt exvressly found that Arthur N.
Grover Farms, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of tlw laws of the State of
Utah and that it is the owner of the fnll title to the farm
covered by the contract of sale. It was organized hy
members of the family of Arthur N. Gron>r and its charter has never been abandoned, cancelled or revoked. Its
affairs are managed and controlled by a board of directors. Its officers and directors are duly qualified to act
as such.

It is the owner in fee simple of the legal and equitable
title to the farm involved in this litigation. It acquired
its title and ownership by a valid and legal conveyance.
It has been in possession of and has continuously operated
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the farm smce it was organized. It has committed no
fraud or other wrong upon the defendants or any of them.
It is prosecuting the present action for the purpose of
recovering property which has been sold without its consent, authorization or approval.
The uncontro\'erted facts establish, and the trial court
found, that the officers who signed the contract of sale
had no authority to do so. There is not a word of evidence, either oral or written, which precludes the corporation from asserting the absence of such authority. The
defendants expressly admit that they knew at the outset of
any negotiations that the farm belonged to the corpor~
tion, that the directors of the corporation were Mr. and
.:\frs. Grover and their daughter, Mrs. Fay Wight, and
that Mrs. ·wight was President. 'rhey knew also that
.Mrs. Grover ·was Yice President and Mr. Grover Secretary-Treasurer. The Articles of Incorporation were a
matter of public record and at all times available for inspection by the defendants. No one made any misrepresentation or gave any erroneous information to any of
the defendants with respect to the status of the property
or of the corporation or its directors or officers.
The defendants likewise knew, or are charged with
the knowledge, that no meeting of the board of directors
was ever held and that no resolution or other action of
the board of directors was ever adopted or taken. No
one represnted or stated to the defendants that the directors or stockholders had considered the proposed sale
or approved its terms. No one represented to the defendants that either Mr. or Mrs. Grover had any authority
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from the directors or stockholders to enter into the sale
contract on behalf of the corporation.
Not only were the defendants aware of the fact that
neither the directors nor the stockholders authorized or
approved the sale, but they were affirmatively advised by
one of the stockholders that no such authorization had
been given. They were warned that if they took possession of the farm, they would be acting at their peril.
There is a total absence of any prior transactions of
a similar character conducted by any of the officers or
directors. There is no pretense that any of the defendants
were misled or deceiYed in any manner by any previous
dealings or contacts with any of the plaintiffs. The defendants entered into the contract with their eyes wide
open and with full information and knowledge of the
status and authority of the parties with whom they were
dealing.

POINT III
THE GROVERS ARE NOT PARTIES TO
THE CONTRACT OF SALE, DID NOT EXECUTE IT AS INDIVIDUALS AND ARE
NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE UNDER IT.
The trial court found that the Grovers executed the
contract of sale in their individual and also in their official capacities, and are liable to the defendants for the
sum of $525.00, the value of grazing rights, and abo the
sum of $5,000.00 for attorney's fees.
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The finding is manifestly erroneous.
Neither of the Grovers is a party to the contract of
sale and neither of them signed it in an individual capacity. .Mrs. Grover signed the contract on behalf of the
corporation in her capacity of Vice President. Mr.
Grover did not sign the contract either in his individual
capacity or on behalf of the corporation. He merely
attested the instrument.
The contract contains no prov1s10n purporting to
impose any liability on anyone except the corporation.
There is not a word, either in or out of the contract of
sale, to indicate any intention on the part of either of the
Grovers to assume any personal responsibility under
the contract.
There is like\vise no basis for holding the Grovers
personally liable upon any theory of breach of implied
warranty of authority. No such theory of liability was
asserted by the defendants in the court below and there
is no finding of any such breach. To sustain the theory,
it is incumbent upon the defendants to establish that they
were ignorant of the lack of authority of the Gron'rs and
that they relied upon the implied warranty. The evidence
in the case controverts both these points. As we have already sho,,-n, the defendants knew or had the means of
knowing that no directors' meeting had ever been held
or that the directors ever authorized or considered the
sale. They were notified before the sale was completed
that it was unauthorized and would be contested.
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:Keither of the Grovers made any oral or written
statement or representation that they had been authorized by the directors to make the sale or execute the contract. None of the defendants \Vas in any manner induced
or persuaded not to investigate the powers or authority
of the Grovers to bind the corporation. Under such circumstances, there is no basis for holding tht: Uronrs individually liable upon the theory of a breach of implied
warranty of authority. Deciding this very qnesttion is
McDonald vs. Liickenbach, 170 Fed. 434. In this case the
president and secretary executed a promissory note
on behalf of the corporation. They also endorsed the note
in their individual capacity. '11lwy were released from
their liability as endorsers by the failure of the holder of
the note to make timely presentatio11 or demand upon the
maker. The payee sought to hold the defendants personally liable as makers of the note upon the theory of implied brPach of warranty of anthorit_\-. The Court of
Appeals held that since the l)laintiff had knowledge of
the lack of anthority, thPre could be no breach of an implied warranty. It said:
"Bnt an absolutely determining factor in this
case is that the third party, the payee in the note,
is not shown to han• been without knowle-dgt', as
to the infirmit.'- of thP pa1wr, if an:-·. In fact, he
had all the information in this respect that the
defendant had."
We have already pointed out that the corporation
cannot be treated as a mere instrumentality of the
Grovers or as thPir alter ego because there are no equitable considerations requiring it and no fraud or wrongdoing to bP circnmnnted. The corporation was not or-
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ganized for any unlav,rful purpose and the Grovers did
not convey their property to it to conceal it from creditors.
The defendants have not been misled or deceived by anything done or onutted by the Grovers.
Even if it were a fact (which it is not) that the
Grovers ovmed all of the stock, the corporation cannot be
treated as their alter ego or vice versa.
"In order to cast aside the legal fiction of district corporate existence as distinguished from
those who own its capital stock, it is not enough
that it is so organized and controlled and its affairs so managed as to make it 'merely an instrumentality, conduit or adjunct' of its stockholders,
but it must further appear that they are the 'business conduits and alter ego of one another,' and
that to recognize their separate entities would aid
the consummation of a wrong. Divested of the
essentials which we liave enumerated, the mere
circumstance that all the capital stock of a corporation is o'nwd or controlled by onP or more persons does not, and should not, destroy its separate
existence; were it otherwise, few private corporations could preserve their distinct indentity, (sic)
which wonld mean the complete destruction of the
primary object of their organization." Erkenbrcch!:'r vs. Grant, 200 Pac. 641.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE CONTRACT OF SALE WAS PREP ARED BY THE GROYERS AND THEIR ATTORNEY.
Mr. Arthur N. Grover testified that the original contract agreement, Exhibit 33, was typed in the bank by the
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bank President, Mr. Nelson. Mr. Ndson, who is not a
lawyer, denied that he prepared this document. He stated
it was brought into the bank in executed form and that
he had nothing to do ·with its preparation (R. 449). His
testimony was :
''I liave never seen that contract until j11st a few
days ago."

"Q.
A.

Have you ever seen an instrument, the original or a cop~v of what I am showing yon,
which is Exhibit 33?"
I have nevn seen it." (R. 472).

After defendants' Exhibit 33 had bet•n sigm·d, l\lr.
Grover returned to the hank and, according to tlw testimony of the hanker, had with him the l'XPc·utPd contrad,
Exhibit 49 and also an Pscrow agrPPmPnt, Exhibit 48.
Exhibit 49 ·was ad.mittPdl~· prPpared in thP office of Mr.
Skeen. However, the banhr states that he had nothing
to do with the preparation of the Pscrow agreement (J~x.
48).
'l'he incontrovertible fact is, plaintiffs' Exhibit 3;3 and
the escrmv agreement wen· prepared in the bank on thP
banker's tnwwriter by the banker. This fact is shown by
the typing on E~xhibits 33, 48, 39, 36, 45 and 4G and is supported by the testimony of l\fr. Grover who tt'stifo•d
they were pre1mred in the bank.
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 3G and 39 are exemplars. They
are admittedly typed on the hanker's typewriter and are
admittedly t.vped by him. The plaintiffs called a handwriting expert, l\Iadge Alsop. Her testimony, contained
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at pages 70G-72G, demonstrates conclusively that the escrow agreement and Exhibit 33 were both prepared on
the same typewriter and probably by the same typist.
The significance of this is that if they were prepared on
the same typewriter, they were prepared in the bank by
someone ·who was not a lawyer and by someone who was
advising Mr. Grover as to the legal effects of his acts.
There is no doubt that this >ms the banker and that the
contract was made under his influence.
Exhibits 45 and 46 are simple blowups of the exemplars and the questioned documents. Examination of
these questioned documents and exemplars, even without
the use of the blowups, should convince any fact finder
that the exemplars and the questioned documents were
prepared on one and the same typewriter.
One of the most significant facts is the figure "8"
shown on plaintiffs' Exhibit 39 and Exhibit 36 and also
on the escrow agreement. The type which makes the
figure "8" has been damaged on the t:1)ewriter in question so that a small irregularity is shmvn in the upper
right-hand quadrant. This irregularity shows on the S's
m the questioned documents and in the exemplars.
The importance of this testimony places the onus of
influencing the negotiations which resulted in a preliminary contract which was subsequently formalized into Exhibit 49, on Mr. Nelson, who represented both buyer and
seller in a legal capacity and points up the damage which
occurs when people receive legal advice from those not
competent to give advice. This is particularly so when
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the seller was old. infinn and, according to the only doctors who examined him and who testified, incompetent
to comprehend and understand what he was doing.
No lawyer would have drawn up an escrow agreement such as that identified in plaintiffs' Exhibit 48, nor
would a lawyer have in any way participated in the preparation of an agreement such as that identified by plaintiffs' Exhibit 33. Those agreements formed the basis of
the sale made and define the obligations of the seller and
buyer.
There is a ready explanation for the failure of Mr.
Nelson to tell the truth with respect to his participation
in the transaction. The contract would enable the Garns
to pay for the property without spending any of their
own money and also be in a much better position to pay
off their large obligation to Mr. Nelson's bank.
SUMMARY
Appellants accept the trial court's finding and deterrnination that the contract of sale was not authorized
by the board of directors of Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc.
or by its stockholders and that the requirements of Section lG-10-74, U.C.A. (1953) were not complied with. Inherent in this finding and determination is the conclusion that neither Estella V. Grover nor Arthur N. Grover
had any authority to execute the contract on behalf of the
corporation. These findings are fully established by the
evidence.
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It is uncontroverted that the contract of sale covered
substantially all the assets of the coropration and that the
sale was not made in the usual course of business of the
corporation.
We also accept the finding of the trial court that
Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah;
that the directors of the corporation were Arthur N.
Grover, Estella V. Grover and Fay G. Wight; that Fay
G. Wight was President, Estella V. Grover, Vice President, and Arthur N. Grover, Secretary and Treasurer;
that the farm land covered by the contract of sale was
owned by Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover, his
wife, prior to the conveyance thereof to the corporation;
and that the property was conveyed to the corporation
in exchange for shares of stock.
We deny any findings that all of the stock of the
corporation was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Grover at the
time the contract of sale was executed and contend that
the uncontradicted evidence proves that at that time the
stock of the corporation was owned by Mr. and Mrs.
Grover and their eight children.
We contend that the plaintiffs are not estopped to
deny that the sale of the property to the defendants and
the execution of the contract were unauthorized or that
the contract of sale is invalid and unenforceable.
The evidence is uncontroverted that the defendants
had full knowledge and the means of obtaining full knowl-
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edge with respect to the lack of authority of the Grovers
to sell or convey the farm lands to the defendants or to
bind the corporation or to execute the contract on behalf
of the corporation. The defendants were notified before
the transaction ·was consmmnated that the Grovers had
no authority to sell the property or to execute the contract
on behalf of the of the corporation.
vVe contend that there is no basis in law or in fact
for piercing the corporate veil and disn~garding the
separate identity of the corporation and treating it as a
mere instrumentality or alter ego of the Grovers. There
are no equitable considerations which require that the
separate identity of the Grnvers and the corporation be
ignored and there is no fraud or wrong to be circumvented.
N eithc>r of the Gro\·en; assnnwd any iwrsonal liability under the contract of salP. They are not parties
to the contract and they did not execute it as incliYiuuals.
It ·was executed h>- :;\frs. Gronr on behalf of the corporation and in her capacity of Yice President. It was attPsted by .Mr. Grover as SPerPtary of the corporation.
Neither of tlw Grovers can be hPld iwrsonally liable
for any breach of implied warrant>· of authority becansc>
the defendants had full knowledgP and the means of full
knowledge of the lack of authority in the Grovers to bind
the corporation. They did not rely npon an>· implied
warranty of authority.
Appellants contend that the finding of the court below that both Mr. and l\Irs. Grover at tlw time of th(_•
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execution of the contract possessed wfficient mental
capacity to enter into the agreement and were physically
and mentally capable of understanding and appreciating
the nature and effect of the transaction, and did so understand and appreciate, and exercised their own free
will in the l'Xecution thereof, is contrary to the evidence
which discloses that l\Irs. Grover at that time was aged,
infirm and suffering from heart trouble, and required
('Onstant medical care and attention; that she was practi('ally blind and unable to read any docunwnt ·without the
aid of a magnifying glass; that she did not read the contract of sale and did not know or understand its contents
or its legal signficance; that in signing the contract, she
acted solely under the influence and }Jersuasion of her
husband and undPr a lack of understanding of the nature
and legal effect of th0 contract; that Mr. Grover was
himself ag('d, infirm, ill and unable to understand and
appreciate the legal effect of the contract of sale.
\Ve also maintain that it is immmaterial whether
Pither Mr. or Mrs. Grover was legally competent to make
or en1er into a contract of sale of the prorwrty because
neither of them made or entered into any contract with
tlw defendants or incmTed any liability or assumed any
obligaion nnder it.
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that the contract of sale was not authorized by the board of directors
nor approved by the stockholders; that the officers who
executed it had no authority to do so; it is void and of
no legal force or effect and should be canceled and set
aside; that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Grover are parties to the
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contract of sale or assumed any obligation or liability
thereunder; that the judgment and decree appealed from
is erroneous and should be vacated and set aside and the
trial court directed to enter its judgment and decree
canceling the contract of sale and requiring the def endants to account for their operations of the farm alld the
rents, issues and profits received by th~m.
Respectfully submitted,
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